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Abstract 
 
Research on transnational advocacy networks has tended to focus on how non-state 
actors from developed countries interact with those from developing countries to 
pressure states, often by drawing in liberal Western states. This article adds a different 
perspective, focusing on how local civil society actors in different locales interact 
with each other to persuade their own governments Ôfrom belowÕ. It examines how 
these actors facilitate norm emergence amongst Asian states on issues with little 
domestic traction and for which there are well-developed international norms, 
standards and procedures. In studying the way local civil society actors conduct norm 
entrepreneurship, it is important to recognise the political, material and ideational 
conditions that constrain their work; their positionality and fragility in their own 
societies; and the way they relate to other actors working on the same issues. 
Focusing on the case of the Asia Pacific Refugee Rights Network, it is argued that 
working through a formalised network has changed the ways and the conditions under 
which local civil society actors engage in norm entrepreneurship on refugee 
protection. It has changed the attributes of actors, helping them develop visibility, 
capacity and connectedness through the formation of a Ôcommunity of practiceÕ; it has 
changed power relations between them and other actors Ð in particular, the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; it has facilitated the development of 
Ôregional imaginationÕ and the practice of Ôscale shiftingÕ, helping local actors move 
beyond domestic contexts to engage with state and non-state actors through regional 
and international fora. It has also introduced shifts in the dynamics of norm 
entrepreneurship by introducing a new actor Ð the network itself, which exercises 
agency through a Secretariat Ð and intra-network sensitivities, which need careful 
attention to prevent member disengagement.  
Keywords: civil society; norm entrepreneurs; networks; UNHCR; refugees  
 
Introduction
1
 
 
In November 2008, over 110 participants from around 70 civil society groups and 
organisations based in 13 countries in the Asia Pacific region met in Kuala Lumpur to 
discuss the protection of refugees. It was an unprecedented gathering. Service 
providers, advocacy groups, lawyers, and refugee community-based organisations in 
countries of asylum Ð such as Malaysia, Thailand, India, Nepal, Japan, South Korea, 
and Australia Ð met human rights groups and activists in refugee-producing countries 
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such as Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan. Organisations located in different 
countries serving refugees from the same country of origin were able to share their 
experiences, compare notes, and discuss the challenges they faced. Previously isolated 
in their work, championing issues with little domestic traction in their own countries, 
they experienced unexpected camaraderie.  
 
The issues of their concern were Ð and indeed continue to be Ð pressing. In spite of 
the presence of millions of refugees and the existence of some of largest and longest 
protracted encampment situations in the world, only a minority of states in the Asia 
Pacific region are party to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
and its 1967 Protocol. There are no regional conventions that recognise the rights of 
refugees, and most states neither have domestic legislation recognising refugees nor 
functioning national asylum systems. Without formal legal recognition, many 
refugees have been treated as irregular migrants and subject to arrest, detention, 
punishment for immigration offences, and deportation. Many refugees have been 
forced to eke out a living in the shadow economy, suffering violations of their labour 
and human rights. Some have languished indefinitely in immigration detention centres 
and prisons without access to protection. Some have fallen prey to traffickers in 
search of safety. In India, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Thailand, hundreds of thousands of 
refugees have been kept indefinitely in overcrowded refugee camps.  
 
At the conference, participants expressed joy and surprise at meeting like-minded 
people, having felt alone and alienated in their work. They also shared common 
frustrations and concerns Ð with their governments, with the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and with fellow citizens unsympathetic to the 
protection of refugees. The participants discussed a range of issues Ð from the 
challenges involved in gaining government recognition of the status and rights of 
refugees, to the abuses refugees faced in detention, to the specific risks that women 
and children experienced, and the inability of refugees to gain access to health care.
2
 
A unanimous observation at the conference was that it was crucial for states in the 
region to protect refugees. To this aim, the participants resolved to stay connected and 
to work together Ð the Asia Pacific Refugee Rights Network (APRRN) was born. 
 
How do local civil society actors work together to facilitate the adoption of new 
norms amongst states? What are the challenges they face in facilitating Ônorm 
emergenceÕ on issues with little domestic traction and for which there are well-
developed international norms? How does the formation and formalisation of a 
transnational advocacy network influence the ways and the conditions under which 
they engage in norm entrepreneurship?  
 
In this paper, I analyse the role that local civil society actors play in advocating for 
refugee protection in the Asia Pacific region. This case study is particularly 
interesting because of the persistence of most states in the region in ÔrejectingÕ norms 
on refugee protection in spite of the institutionalisation and implementation of these 
norms in most part of the world. Scholars refer to this as the ÔAsian exceptionalismÕ 
to refugee protection
3
 or the ÔAsian rejectionÕ of refugee law.
4
 This is a case where 
norm diffusion has not been successful in spite of the significant effort of state and 
non-state actors in promoting these norms over decades Ð it is a case of the Òdog who 
didnÕt barkÓ.
5
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The domestic conditions for norm entrepreneurship on refugee protection have been 
unfavourable. Local civil society actors have had to contend with dominant 
(nationalist) ideas that the rights and welfare of citizens take precedence over those of 
non-citizens, and that non-citizens with irregular status are ÔcriminalsÕ. State officials 
in Asia also tend to see refugee protection as a ÔUNHCR problemÕ or an Ôinternational 
problemÕ, rather than a domestic or regional one requiring long-term, local solutions. 
The treaty-based international refugee rights regime has become very technically 
sophisticated and exclusive, involving negotiations between actors and in spaces that 
exclude many Asian local civil society actors. Compared to other actors in the field of 
refugee protection Ð in particular, UNHCR and international non-governmental 
organisations (INGOs) Ð local civil society actors also tend to be smaller, less 
resourced, less financially stable, and more vulnerable to political attack. 
 
This paper focuses on the very early stage of the norm Ôlife cycleÕ, in the phase of 
Ônorm emergenceÕ as identified by Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink.
6
 It 
focuses on the ways and the conditions under which local civil society actors conduct 
norm entrepreneurship on unpopular issues where there are well-developed 
international norms, standards, and procedures. Scholarship on transnational advocacy 
networks tends to focus on the interactions between transnational actors and local 
actors, and on the involvement of liberal Western states in socialising norm violators.
7
 
This article seeks to add a different perspective, by focusing on how local civil society 
actors interact with each other through a formalised network in order to pressure 
governments Ôfrom belowÕ. 
 
In studying norm entrepreneurship amongst local civil society actors, it is important to 
recognise the political, material and ideational conditions that constrain their work; 
their positionality and fragility in their own societies; and the ways they relate to other 
actors working on the same issues. Focusing on the case of APRRN, I argue that 
working through a formalised civil society network has changed the ways and the 
conditions under which local actors in Asia engage in norm entrepreneurship in four 
main ways. Firstly, it has changed the attributes of actors, helping them develop 
visibility, capacity, and connectedness. It does this through the formation of a 
Ôcommunity of practiceÕ
8
, a Ôsafe spaceÕ through which civil society actors with 
common goals interact with each other to strengthen their own knowledge, expertise, 
practices, and connections. Secondly, it has changed power-relations between them 
and other actors Ð in particular, UNHCR. UNHCR is often the most dominant 
influence in socialising local civil society actors about refugee protection. It is also 
often a gatekeeper Ð not just of issues but also of tactics and strategies for advocacy. 
By networking with each other, local civil society actors are able to gain alternative 
perspectives on issues and to engage with UNHCR in multiple ways.  
 
Thirdly, working through a network has helped local civil society actors to move 
beyond their local contexts and to develop Ôregional imaginationÕ about their struggle. 
It has facilitated Ôscale shiftingÕ, coordinating claims making at different levels than 
where the claims first began
9
, thus opening up more diverse fora for engagement with 
states. When its members construct governmental audiences for advocacy, their 
primary strategy is not to draw in Western liberal states to pressure their own states 
Ôfrom aboveÕ. Instead, using a range of tactics and strategies, they appeal to their own 
governments and to governments in the region as concerned citizens and residents to 
adhere to norms on the basis that it constitutes Ôappropriate behaviourÕ.  
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Last but not least, the network has introduced shifts in the dynamics of norm 
entrepreneurship in two ways. It has introduced a new actor Ð the network itself, 
which exercises its own agency through a Secretariat Ð who sometimes 
(inadvertently) competes with local civil society actors in norm entrepreneurship. It 
has also introduced intra-network sensitivities that need careful attention Ð in 
particular, the need to ensure that power, leadership, and participation is balanced 
between members with different identities. If unattended to, these can lead to member 
disengagement. 
 
Norm Emergence, Norm Entrepreneurs 
 
In their landmark paper, Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink define a norm as a 
Òstandard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identityÓ.
10
 They identify 
three phases in a norm Ôlife-cycleÕ in international politics Ð norm emergence, norm 
acceptance, and norm internalisation. Drawing upon work of Cass Sunstein
11
, they 
observe that norm entrepreneurs Ð agents who build support for the adoption of new 
norms Ð play a key role in the first phase. Norm entrepreneurs persuade a critical 
number of states to adopt new norms, usually through an organisational platform. A 
key task in this endeavour is to create and frame issues so that they resonate with 
local audiences.
12
   
 
The states that adopt these norms then act as norm leaders, socialising other states to 
do the same. After a tipping point is reached, a norm cascade occurs, in which states 
rapidly take on these new norms.
13
 These norms are then internalised and 
institutionalised to the point that they are taken for granted. Finnemore and Sikkink 
note that: ÒUp to the tipping point, little normative change occurs without significant 
domestic movements supporting such changeÓ.
14
 What is the ÔworkÕ that goes into 
building such support at the domestic level? What are the preconditions for 
ÔpersuasionÕ? How do norm entrepreneurs with similar goals relate to each other?  
 
Reflecting on the process of norm diffusion in Southeast Asia, Amitav Acharya 
contrasts a moral cosmopolitan perspective Ð in which transnational agents ÔteachÕ 
cosmopolitan norms through Ômoral proselytismÕ and regard local resistance to such 
norms as ÔillegitimateÕ or ÔimmoralÕ Ð with a perspective that emphasises the 
importance of examining the domestic conditions that influence the receipt of new 
norms and the role that local actors play as norm-makers and norm brokers.
15 
Acharya 
observes that contestation between transnational norms and local beliefs and practices 
reduces the likelihood of norm diffusion. Local agents need to engage in Ôconstitutive 
localisationÕ, reconstructing norms so that they become congruent with local beliefs 
and practices. ÒThe success of norm diffusion strategies and processesÓ, Acharya 
argues, Òdepends on the extent to which they provide opportunities for localizationÓ.
16
 
He further states,  
 
The prospect for localization also depends on its positive impact on the 
legitimacy and authority of key norm-takers [states], the strength of prior local 
norms, the credibility and prestige of local agents, indigenous cultural traits 
and traditions, and the scope for grafting and pruning presented by foreign 
norms.
 17
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AcharyaÕs analysis suggests why it is difficult for local civil society actors to persuade 
Asian states to commit to refugee protection. In addition to the existence of 
unfavourable local beliefs, the scope for ÔgraftingÕ (associating a new norm with a 
pre-existing norm) and ÔpruningÕ (adjusting foreign ideas to fit more easily with local 
beliefs and practices) is limited. Local civil society actors seek the commitment and 
compliance of Asian states to the rules, principles, standards and procedures of the 
international refugee rights regime, a regime rooted in the 1951 Convention and its 
1967 Protocol and supervised by UNHCR, who in turn is advised by an inter-state 
body, the Executive Committee.
18
 As such, while local civil society actors engage in 
reframing, applying, and strategically deploying international norms to local settings, 
their desire for state commitment to an existing international regime delimits the 
extent to which they (are willing to) adapt such norms.  
 
Scholars have assessed how different types of actors have engaged in norm 
entrepreneurship on different issues Ð from influential individuals
19
 to federal 
agencies
20
, regional organisations,
21
 and states.
22
 There is also a large and growing 
body of work that examines how local civil society actors act individually and 
transnationally to (re)interpret, (re)represent, and (re)constitute ÔglobalÕ ideas, 
principles and norms for domestic contexts.
23
  
 
Local Actors, Transnational Networks 
 
Muthiah Alagappa provides a useful definition of Ôcivil society actorsÕ, referring to 
them as Òself-organised, self-governing, nonstate, non-profit, nonprivate institutions 
that employ nonviolent means to achieve a public interest or good through collective 
actionÓ.
 24
 Local civil society actors typically comprise of citizens and non-citizens 
who engage in activities at the domestic level to achieve outcomes with 
governments.
25
 As such, they are distinct from regional and international NGOs in 
terms of how they operate and how they are structured, governed, and resourced. 
 
Local civil society actors are uniquely located socio-politically vis--vis their own 
governments. As ÔinsidersÕ they are able to shape public opinion in the local 
vernacular, and to engage with the judiciary, legislative, and executive with local 
legitimacy. They can raise critical reflections on Ôappropriate behaviourÕ without 
facing some of the legitimacy challenges that INGOs face.
26
 They are not as easily 
dismissed as ÔoutsidersÕ who ÔinterfereÕ in the domestic affairs of a state. The 
argument that refugee protection is a ÔWestern ideaÕ Ð particularly salient in 
postcolonial, nationalistic societies Ð becomes harder to defend. 
 
However, states shape the level of influence that local civil society actors have on 
national policy debates. As Robert Pekkanen observes in the case of Japan, the 
governmentÕs imposition of structural and ideational constraints on domestic civil 
society organisations has made it difficult for them to establish their authority and 
legitimacy based on expertise, which in turn, limits their influence on policy-making. 
Political opportunities for the advancement of rights also often occur when states are 
particularly concerned about their reputation, or domestic political elites perceive 
themselves to be vulnerable to condemnation.
27
 Unfortunately, it is also in these 
moments of heightened perceived vulnerability when state and non-state actors react 
by threatening activists.  
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Sally Engle Merry also points out that local civil society actors can be vulnerable as 
they ÔvernaculariseÕ human rights ideas.
28
 As intermediaries between global and local 
contexts, they can be distrusted and misconstrued as being ÔdisloyalÕ. Indeed, in his 
report to the UN General Assembly in October 2015, the UN Special Rapporteur on 
the Situation of Human Rights Defenders identified defenders seeking to protect the 
rights of minorities and refugees as one of the Ômost at-riskÕ groups of defenders.
29
 
 
There has been a growing body of work on how civil society actors work through 
transnational advocacy networks to facilitate change in state behaviour. Margaret 
Keck and Kathryn Sikkink provide the classic definition of such networks, referring 
to them as Ònetworks of activists, distinguishable largely by the centrality of 
principled ideas or values in motivating their formationÓ.
30
 They observe that 
transnational advocacy networks help local actors to gain momentum on issues with 
their own governments through building international pressure from ÔoutsideÕ Ð what 
they call the ÔboomerangÕ effect.  
 
Scholarship on such networks has tended to focus on how transnational actors Ð often 
based in the North Ð collaborate with local actors to change state behaviour, often by 
involving liberal, Western states. There has been less scholarship on how local civil 
society actors in the South work together to build state commitment to people-centred 
norms without involving Western states. As Csar Rodrguez-Garavito observes, 
shifts in the relative power of states means that human rights work is now conducted 
in a Ômulti-polar world orderÕ, in which: 
 
states and NGOs in the Global North no longer have sole control over the 
creation and implementation of human rights standards, as new actors (from 
transnational social movements to transnational corporations to Global South 
states and NGOs) emerge as influential voices.31  
Drawing on his experiences in Latin America, he describes how local civil society 
actors collaborated to put simultaneous pressure on their own states and another 
powerful state in the region to achieve their goals, bypassing a traditional ally, the 
United States Ð what he refers to as a Ômultiple boomerangÕ strategy.
32
 
 
Although the primary aim of local civil society actors is to convince their own states 
of the need to adopt norms, such engagements can be located at multiple levels Ð at 
local, national, regional, and international fora. Social movement theorists observe 
that agents who operate at one level sometimes shift the scale of their action, either 
moving ÔupwardsÕ, from local action outwards, or ÔdownwardsÕ, applying practices at 
a broader level to a local context.
33
 They define a Ôscale shiftÕ as Òa change in the 
number and level of coordinated contentious actions to a different focal point, 
involving a new range of actors, different objects, and broadened claimsÓ.
34
 As 
Sidney Tarrow elaborates, scale shifting involves five mechanisms: coordination 
(planning collaboration across space) brokerage (facilitating such linkages), 
theorization (generalising an idea from a particular reality so that it can be applied to 
other realities), target shifting (focusing on a new target), and claim shifting 
(changing the nature of the claim).
35
 Formal networks can facilitate such scale shifting 
by identifying opportunities and fora for collaborative action and maximising the 
participation of members in these. 
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Refugee Protection in the Asia Pacific Region: An Overview  
 
UNHCR notes the presence of 3.5 million refugees and 1.4 million stateless persons 
in the Asia Pacific region in 2015, with the majority of refugees originating from 
Afghanistan and Myanmar.
36
 Most refugees in this region seek asylum in 
neighbouring countries. A smaller proportion of refugees travel across multiple 
borders to reach their preferred destination, sometimes after various periods of 
settlement in different countries. Refugees from Myanmar, for example, travel 
through Thailand to reach Malaysia, and refugees from Sri Lanka, Afghanistan and 
Myanmar travel through Indonesia and Malaysia in an attempt to reach Australia. 
Refugees from outside the region are relatively small in number, coming primarily 
from the Middle East and Africa. Well-developed smuggling and trafficking networks 
cut across Asian states, often involving chains of smugglers and traffickers. On the 
whole, the movements of refugees in this region are ÔmixedÕ with the movement of 
migrant workers, students, and tourists, and constitute a very small proportion of 
people on the move. Over two-thirds of refugees live outside of camps, typically in 
urban areas with insecurity.
37
 
 
In countries with relatively large refugee populations, UNHCR takes on operational 
responsibilities belonging to states, such as refugee status determination (RSD), 
protection intervention, community services, and resettlement, acting as a Ôsurrogate 
stateÕ.
38
 Without the resources to fully substitute the role of a state, UNHCRÕs 
capacity to protect refugees is limited. In Thailand and Malaysia, for example, asylum 
seekers wait years for UNHCR to register and determine their status, a situation that 
UNHCR itself recognises as a significant protection problem. The lack of prospects 
for repatriation and local integration has led UNHCR to rely upon resettlement as a 
means of ÔunlockingÕ protracted refugee situations. In 2013, Nepal, Thailand, and 
Malaysia were the top three countries in the world from which UNHCR-assisted 
resettlement occurred.
39
 However, resettlement only benefits a fraction of the refugee 
population Ð most refugees live in limbo, waiting with fear and uncertainty for a 
durable solution. 
 
Nationalist pride and anti-colonial sentiments colour the interpretation of Asian 
governments of the efforts of UNHCR. Refugees are often seen as politically sensitive 
populations, as threats to national security, and unwanted Ôirregular migrantsÕ.
40
 The 
advice of UNHCR thus touches on how a state manages foreign relations and national 
security, which are fundamental expressions of state sovereignty.
41
 Governments 
sometimes dismiss UNHCRÕs interventions as a ÔWestern impositionÕ. The 
Eurocentric origins of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, and the perceived 
exclusion of the perspectives of Asian governments in their drafting, does not help.
42
  
 
In South and Southeast Asia, only one of the eight members of the South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)
43
 Ð Afghanistan Ð and only two of 
the 10 members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Ð Cambodia 
and the Philippines Ð are parties to the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol.
44
 The 
lack of legal infrastructure poses a significant challenge for their protection. The 
existing practice in South and Southeast Asia is that states accommodate refugees on 
the basis of ÔhospitalityÕ or humanitarian concern rather than obligation. States have 
preferred to negotiate over the protection of specific groups of refugees rather than 
grant asylum to all refugees in a systematic and impartial manner. These negotiations 
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have tended to be temporal, contingent, and politicized, informed by foreign policy 
considerations and the political affiliations of government leaders.  
 
While UNHCR, scholars, and practitioners alike have praised Asian states for 
protecting refugees on humanitarian grounds, this non-binding, non-legal approach 
has resulted in uncertain protection.
45
 As Martin Jones critiques, this Ôprotection 
spaceÕ approach also  
 
privileges international interests, fora, and UNHCR as the negotiator; devalues 
the normative strength of obligations towards refugees; and, allows the 
underlying responsibility for the provision of refugee protection to drift from 
the state to UNHCR.
46
 
 
The operational environment for refugees in Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific is 
somewhat different. While many states are party to the 1951 Convention and the 1967 
Protocol, there is significant variation in the way they protect refugees. Australia, in 
particular, has interpreted its international obligations in controversial ways Ð 
engaging in Ôthird-country processingÕ (sending asylum seekers arriving by boat to 
Nauru and Manus Island in Papua New Guinea for the determination of their 
protection claims); practicing the mandatory detention of non-citizens unlawfully 
present in its territory, resulting in the non-reviewable and indefinite detention of 
asylum seekers
47
; and in 2014, negotiating a multi-million dollar transfer arrangement 
with Cambodia, in which refugees recognised in Nauru would be ÔresettledÕ to 
Cambodia. 
 
China
48
, Japan, and the Republic of Korea are all party to the 1951 Convention and 
1967 Protocol. The latter two countries have introduced domestic law on refugees and 
conduct RSD. However, asylum seekers do not have full access to fair and timely 
RSD procedures. These countries detain asylum-seekers, and tend to provide 
protection only as a matter of discretion and humanitarian action rather than as a 
matter of responsibility or obligation.
 49
  Asylum-seekers and refugees are largely 
marginalized and excluded from society, resulting in serious discrimination, 
destitution, homelessness, and abuse.
50
  
 
Local Civil Society Actors and Challenges to Norm Entrepreneurship on 
Refugee Protection 
 
In many countries in the Asia Pacific region, local civil society actors are the main 
service providers to refugees. They engage in a wide range of activities, from 
education, legal aid in domestic courts, legal representation for RSD (conducted by 
states and UNHCR), and medical assistance, to shelters, livelihood projects, welfare 
support and resettlement referrals.
51
 They also advocate for reforms in laws, policies, 
and administrative practices using a range of tactics and strategies, so that refugees 
are formally recognised and their rights protected.  
 
For example, amongst APRRN members, in South Korea, the Korean Public Interest 
Lawyers' Group (Gonggam), Dongcheon Public Interest Foundation, Refuge Pnan, 
Nancen, and Advocates for Public Interest Law played a key role in drafting and 
advocating for a domestic Refugee Act that was passed in 2012 and took effect in 
2013.
52
 Members of the Migration Working Group in Malaysia use human rights 
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mechanisms such as the Universal Periodic Review Process to advocate for refugee 
protection.
53
 In India, the Organisation for Eeelam Refugees Rehabilitation, which 
runs and supports most of the services in camps for Sri Lankan refugees, is the 
primary interlocutor and advocate for refugee issues with the Indian government, 
NGOs and donors. In addition to providing legal and social assistance to refugees, the 
Japan Association for Refugees conducts policy advocacy, pressuring Japan to adhere 
to its international obligations concerning refugees.
54
  
 
Nevertheless, building momentum and support for refugee protection continues to be 
an uphill task. When arguments for refugee protection are made, a common opposing 
refrain Ð from government officials, the public and some civil society actors Ð is that 
governments should first focus on improving the conditions of (disenfranchised) 
citizens before focusing on non-citizens.
55
 Local civil society actors also contend with 
strong beliefs and practices that erode refugee protection, such as the perception of 
migrants with irregular status as ÔcriminalsÕ. As described earlier, most refugees in the 
Asia Pacific region are part of Ômixed migration flowsÕ Ð that is, they often travel 
using the same routes as other migrants and rely on the same smuggling networks to 
cross borders. Refugees sometimes have mixed motives, fleeing from their country of 
origin not just out of fear of persecution but also to seek a better life. As such, in 
public imagination, they are easily dismissed as irregular migrants. In states where 
there is strong securitization of migration and no national asylum systems, refugees 
are legally and socially indistinct from irregular migrants. Antipathy towards irregular 
migrants makes it challenging to build public support for refugees.   
 
As stated earlier, government officials in Asia tend to see refugees as an 
ÔinternationalÕ or ÔUNHCRÕ problem, rather than a domestic problem. In Southeast 
Asia, this is part of the legacy of the Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese 
Refugees (from 1988-1996), in which states agreed to host refugee populations 
temporarily while UNHCR conducted RSD and arranged for their resettlement or 
repatriation. This ÔarrangementÕ is the expectation of government officials today. In 
Malaysia, government officials expect UNHCR to conduct RSD and blame them for 
not resettling refugees quickly enough. In Thailand, government officials still call the 
decades-old refugee camps along the Thai-Burma border Ôtemporary sheltersÕ. As a 
result of this line of thinking, government officials do not focus on local integration as 
a durable solution, thinking instead that the ÔrightÕ treatment of refugees is their return 
or resettlement.  
 
The international refugee regime has also grown in complexity over time. In order to 
participate in global debates concerning refugees, local civil society actors concerned 
about the rights and welfare of refugees have had to learn unfamiliar terminology, 
procedures, standards, and systems Ð such as those related to RSD, the care of 
vulnerable groups (such as unaccompanied minors and survivors of sexual and 
gender-based violence), and resettlement. International negotiation and strategy 
development concerning refugee protection tends to privilege some types of actors 
while excluding others. For example, every year, states, UNHCR and NGOs discuss 
global resettlement through the Annual Tripartite Consultations on Resettlement in 
Geneva. While these discussions are a key part of global strategising on protection
56
, 
and while Thailand, Nepal, and Malaysia have historically been amongst the top five 
countries from which UNHCR-assisted refugees have been resettled, local civil 
society actors in these countries have rarely participated in these dialogues, because 
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they are not directly involved in resettlement. In summary, the professionalization of 
refugee protection has alienated local civil society actors and refugees. 
 
Local civil society actors are also different operationally and structurally from 
UNHCR and INGOs. Often formed and run by very committed, independent-minded, 
strong-willed leaders, they tend to be smaller and have fewer resources than their 
international and regional counterparts. They often struggle to meet overwhelming 
needs and to keep programmes viable in the face of scarce financial resources. In 
most countries in Asia, governments do not fund domestic refugee programmes. 
Some institutional donors do not support civil society groups in middle- and high-
income countries; some require grantees to have formal registration as a non-profit 
organisation, which is difficult for groups restricted by domestic laws. Local civil 
society actors are also subject to scrutiny, surveillance and regulation by state 
authorities; they can be targeted easily by their own governments for their activities.
57
  
 
Networking for Refugee Protection: Forming a transnational Ôcommunity of 
practiceÕ 
 
APRRN was set up specifically to foster collaboration between members and to equip 
them to influence state behaviour on refugee protection. It does this through joint 
advocacy, capacity strengthening, and knowledge/resource sharing and outreach.
58
 In 
an effort to create a Ôsafe spaceÕ for civil society, membership in the network is 
restricted to civil society actors alone Ð those who work for the government, 
intergovernmental bodies, and the media are not permitted to join this network. At 
point of writing, in 2015, APRRN has 136 organisational and 114 individual 
members.
59
 Most of APRRNÕs organisational members comprise local civil society 
groups and organisations based in the Asia Pacific region, such as legal aid providers, 
service providers, human rights advocacy organisations, universities, and refugee 
community-based organizations.
60
 Its individual members primarily comprise 
academic scholars, researchers, students, and lawyers.  
 
When APRRN was formed in 2008, its members created Working Groups so that they 
could interact with each other in a number of ways. There are four geographic 
Working Groups: South Asia, Southeast Asia, East Asia, and Australia, New Zealand 
and the Pacific, and five thematic Working Groups: Legal Aid and Advocacy, 
Immigration Detention, Women and Girls at Risk, The Right to Health, and 
Statelessness. This crosscutting structure enables APRRN members to work on 
multiple issues at the same time and to avoid Ôgate-keepingÕ in issue adoption
61
, 
which is important, given the complexities of the issues that refugees faced in the 
region. 
 
A Steering Committee comprised of elected and appointed members provides 
strategic leadership to the Network; a Secretariat based in Bangkok operationalizes its 
plans.
62
 The Steering Committee is responsible for the governance of the Network, 
and is accountable to APRRNÕs members who meet at its biannual conference, the 
Asia Pacific Consultation on Refugee Rights (APCRR).
63
 Over time, APRRN has 
become more formalised, transitioning from a member-driven network to a 
Secretariat-based one. 
 
Strengthening Visibility, Capacity, and Connectedness 
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APRRN helps to make visible local civil society support for refugees, thus positioning 
refugee protection as an issue of domestic interest. The work of APRRN members is 
featured in APRRNÕs newsletters, wiki pages, blog, Facebook pages, and tweets. 
APRRN organises panels and sessions at regional and international conferences, 
creating opportunities for APRRN members to build support for refugee protection 
with civil society groups working on other issues. It provides its members and 
external stakeholders with a network of contacts that they can use to identify and 
access those with knowledge, skills and expertise on refugees in different countries. 
Before APRRN was formed, it was difficult to work out who was doing what and 
where with refugees across the region.
64
 
 
APRRNÕs activities have fostered the building of a Ôcommunity of practiceÕ amongst 
its members. APRRN members consult each other on thorny problems, express 
solidarity, discuss ideas, and share resources through APRRN events and 
communication channels. In addition to its biannual conference, APRRN runs 
specialist courses and workshops aimed at strengthening the technical expertise of 
members on the international refugee rights regime as well as on specialist topics such 
as refugee mental health, legal aid provision, and ending and limiting immigration 
detention. APRRN also releases joint statements to draw attention to human rights 
violations and state practices that erode refugee protection. These public statements 
not only reiterate the principles, standards and values which APRRN members 
promote, the process of writing them are an important way in which members debate 
advocacy positions and develop consensus.
65
 
 
APRRNÕs added value is most evident when it facilitates collaboration between civil 
society actors in different locales who work on the same issue. In 2015, for example, 
in response to the maritime crisis in which Rohingya refugees and Bangladeshi 
migrants were left stranded at sea by smugglers and traffickers, the APRRN 
Secretariat facilitated a number of teleconferences through which local civil society 
actors pieced together their understanding of the movements and government 
responses, and coordinated advocacy initiatives. Similarly, when UNHCR announced 
that year that it was rethinking its approach to RSD fundamentally, recognising its 
structural inability to process overwhelming caseloads according to procedural and 
other standards, APRRNÕs Legal Aid and Advocacy Working Group met in 
teleconferences to discuss their engagement with UNHCR.  
 
The interactions and relationships between members at APRRN activities have led to 
a number of bilateral and multilateral collaborations initiated by members themselves. 
In Indonesia for example, dialogues facilitated by APRRN members and UNHCR led 
to the formation of the Indonesian Civil Society Network for Refugee Protection 
(SUAKA) in 2012, which provides legal assistance to asylum seekers, conducts 
advocacy, and engages with refugee communities on protection issues.
 66
 Similarly, in 
Pakistan, APRRN members formed a national Refugee Rights Network (RRN-
Pakistan) in 2015 to strengthen their advocacy with the government of Pakistan.
67
  
 
Reconfiguring power-relations with UNHCR 
 
A key way in which APRRN has changed the way in which local civil society actors 
engage in refugee protection is the way it has reconfigured power-relations between 
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them and UNHCR. The relationship between UNHCR and local civil society actors is 
multi-layered, ambivalent, and complex. In many countries in the Asia Pacific region, 
UNHCR takes the lead role in advocating for refugee protection. Many civil society 
actors are dependent on UNHCR for resources, expertise, and the preservation of 
Ôprotection spaceÕ.  
 
Partnerships with UNHCR are particularly important in contexts where refugees are 
vilified as irregular migrants, as they legitimize the work of local civil society actors. 
As such, local civil society actors often work under the protection of UNHCR Ð but 
also under their shadow. Their understanding of refugee protection, prioritisation of 
issues, and imagination of possibilities tends to be shaped in large part by what they 
are told by UNHCR officers based in country offices.
68
 While UNHCR desires the 
support, services, and cooperation of local service providers, it is usually less 
welcoming of their criticism. The attitudes of individual UNHCR officers range from 
respect for the work of local civil society actors to disdain. 
 
APRRN events and communication structures provide members with ways of 
obtaining alternative perspectives on issues, thus reducing UNHCRÕs dominance in 
defining and framing domestic protection agendas. For example, one of the 
contentious issues between local civil society actors and UNHCR has been the way 
that UNHCR conducts registration and RSD in countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia 
and Thailand. Most UNHCR country offices do not welcomed the involvement of 
civil society actors in these procedures. However, APRRN members who provide 
RSD legal aid have been able to come together to raise concerns as a collective with 
UNHCR about the way RSD is conducted, when they would otherwise have been 
silenced.  
 
APRRN members have helped each other to develop productive working 
relationships with UNHCR based on positive experiences elsewhere. For example, 
when Ara Legal Initiative, a provider of RSD legal aid in India, launched its 
organization and programs, the APRRN Secretariat put them in touch with Brian 
Barbour, the Chair of the Legal Aid and Advocacy Working Group, who had already 
developed Standard Operating Procedures with UNHCR in Hong Kong. As a result, 
Ara Legal Initiative was able to finalize its own Letter of Understanding (LOU) with 
UNHCR, secure access to RSD interviews, and reach agreement for UNHCR to 
provide all asylum seekers with detailed reasons for rejection, whether or not they are 
represented.
69
 Other legal aid providers in India can also sign this LOU with UNHCR, 
which is available as a template. 
 
APRRN facilitates member engagement with UNHCR at different levels, for 
example, through organising meeting with UNHCRÕs Regional Office in Bangkok 
and with its Asia Bureau in Geneva. These meetings are particularly helpful when 
dialogue with UNHCR country offices has deteriorated. Before APRRN existed, 
UNHCR relations with civil society largely occurred at the country level with a 
handful of local actors, often their implementing partners. APRRN provides UNHCR 
with an interlocutor with whom it can discuss regional priorities, policy positions and 
good practice with a much broader constituency of civil society actors. This 
engagement helps UNHCR to understand the nature, interests, and potential of civil 
society in the region, which strengthens the way it engages with them.
70
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Scale-shifting: Regional Imagination, Alternative Political Opportunities 
 
APRRN helps its members to develop Ôregional imaginationÕ on refugee protection; it 
helps them situate their own experiences in the broader refugee movement. APRRN 
conferences, workshops and meetings provide members with an audience of peers. 
These interactions serve as a mirror of sorts through which local civil society actors 
reflect on their own domestic and regional roles. As Hotaeg Lee, of Refuge Pnan in 
South Korea observes, deliberations at APRRNÕs East Asia Working Group meetings 
prompted a sense of responsibility amongst Korean NGOs for leading efforts for 
refugee protection at the domestic and sub-regional level.
71
 This multi-level 
perspective helps local civil society actors recognise opportunities for collaboration 
and advocacy at sub-regional, regional and international levels.  
 
The target audience of APRRNÕs members are states in the Asia Pacific region. They 
call on these states to commit to higher standards of behaviour in a number of ways. 
However, they do so not by shaming these states before liberal states in Europe and 
North America. Instead, they appeal to these states as concerned (and outraged) 
citizens and residents who witness the suffering of refugees and believe that this 
should not happen in their own countries. These appeals are for their own states to 
demonstrate behaviour that is morally upright Ð not because such behaviour is good 
for international image, but because it is the right thing to do.  
 
When APRRN members do appeal to other governments, these are primarily other 
governments from within the region. There are two main types of such appeals. The 
first are appeals to regional blocs, such as SAARC and ASEAN, whose collective 
behaviour influences the individual behaviour of states. Secondly, APRRN together 
with organisations such as the International Detention Coalition, have organised 
multi-lateral roundtables that bring together civil society actors and government 
officials from a number of adjacent states.
72
 The purpose of these dialogues is to focus 
on constructive problem solving and collaboration. They encourage the development 
of Ôpilot projectsÕ as a method of trust building. These roundtables are unique because 
they are non-adversarial in tone, focused on practical solutions, and subtly appeal to 
governments to show leadership in the region. 
 
There is untapped potential for engagement in sub-regional and regional processes. 
For example, over the past decade, there has been unprecedented development in the 
regional infrastructure for human rights in Southeast Asia. In 2009, ASEAN 
established the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) 
whose 2010-2015 Work Plan
73
 includes thematic studies on issues such as migration; 
trafficking in persons, particularly women and children; child soldiers; and women 
and children in conflicts and disasters Ð all of which are related to refugee protection. 
In 2012, ASEAN adopted the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, which states: 
ÒEvery person has the right to seek and receive asylum in another State in accordance 
with the laws of such State and applicable international agreementsÓ (Article 16). In 
November 2015, ASEAN members signed its first legally binding regional treaty, the 
ASEAN Convention Against Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 
which bears on the protection of refugees. 
 
At a broader geographical level, in 2009, states reaffirmed their commitment to the 
multilateral Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related 
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Transnational Crime, co-chaired by Australia and Indonesia. At that time, there was 
an increase of asylum seekers arriving by boats to Australia, Rohingyas were being 
forcibly expelled from Myanmar, and there was a humanitarian crisis in northeast Sri 
Lanka.
74
 In 2011, members of the Bali Process endorsed a Regional Cooperation 
Framework to reduce irregular migration in the Asia Pacific region. Although 
UNHCRÕs attempts to feature refugee protection strongly in this Framework have not 
been successful
75
, the Regional Support Office that operationalizes the Framework is 
open to dialogue with civil society actors on irregular migration and refugee 
protection. 
 
APRRNÕs value lies in facilitating norm entrepreneurship and collaborative 
relationships amongst local civil society actors in different locations across the region, 
and in identifying (and indeed creating) political opportunities for advocacy at sub-
regional, regional, and international levels. APRRN members are often too engrossed 
in their own work at the domestic level, and too overwhelmed by the daily needs of 
refugees to engage effectively at these broader levels. The APRRN Secretariat can 
help members participate in these by monitoring developments in these processes, 
building alliances with relevant stakeholders, briefing APRRN members on the 
technicalities and politics of these processes, strategising advocacy, and facilitating 
the participation of members in key meetings at key moments. At point of writing, 
there is consensus amongst states, civil society and UNHCR that regional cooperation 
and regional solutions are required for refugee-related crisis in South and Southeast 
Asia, such as the maritime movement of Rohingyas. The APRRN Secretariat is well 
placed to facilitate the engagement of members in the development of such regional 
cooperation arrangements. 
 
Managing intra-network sensitivities 
 
The formation and formalisation of APRRN has changed the ways in which local civil 
society actors relate to each other. These reconfigurations of ties, however, also bring 
about new challenges. The first is how APRRN creates and maintains space for local 
civil society actors (both members and non-members) to advocate for refugee 
protection without Ôtaking overÕ scarce resources and political space. As it is unique 
network, it has become the Ôgo-toÕ civil society actor on refugee protection in Asia. 
When UNHCR, states, or civil society groups want Asian civil society voices in 
workshops or events, they often turn to the APRRN Secretariat. APRRN Secretariat 
staff can either decide to attend these events themselves, or recommend the 
participation of the most relevant member Ð in most cases, the member closest to the 
ground and/or the one with the greatest expertise or knowledge of issues.  
 
Decisions like these, apparently simple, are not easy to make. On one hand, 
strengthening the work of members is the raison d'tre of the Network. Participation 
in events and meetings can be valuable opportunities for APRRN members to build 
their own visibility, conduct advocacy, and engage in networking. On the other hand, 
to continue to exist, the Secretariat needs to ensure that it remains relevant to 
movement building.
76
 That is, its own visibility Ð as a group of experts, coordinators, 
and facilitators Ð is important. Should they extend invitations to members, or attend 
events themselves? When allocating such resources, transparency, fairness, and 
collective accountability in decision-making is important. Otherwise, it is easy for 
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decisions to be made on (what are perceived to be) arbitrary criteria and for members 
to feel resentful.  
 
The power-relations between members also need careful navigation. Sub-regional 
identities and related sensitivities matter. At a broad level, it is important for there to 
be ÔbalanceÕ in participation across the four sub-regions in the Network Ð South Asia; 
Southeast Asia; East Asia; and Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific Ð so that one 
sub-region does not dominate in terms of leadership and decision-making. It is also 
particularly important for ÔNorthernÕ members in the network respect the agency and 
views of ÔSouthernÕ members, and to refrain from Ôtelling them what to doÕ. Such 
behaviour is frowned upon (often implicitly, in the ÔAsian wayÕ), and would work 
against the ethos of APRRN, which values mutual respect and solidarity. Similarly, it 
is important for the Network to consider gender, class, and other identity-based 
dynamics in the life of the Network, and to ensure that all members enjoy inclusion 
and substantive equality.  
 
A lack of attentiveness to intra-network sensitivities can result in member 
disengagement. Emphasising the importance of recognising the voluntary nature of 
civil society networks and thus the capacity for members to exit the network (or to 
remain dormant), Kathryn Sikkink observes, 
 
For networks-as-actors, network nodes choose whether to participate in 
networks. This gives networks their informal nature and means that you canÕt 
Òlock-inÓ either members or commitments. Thus networks must create 
benefits for network members, what many authors refer to as network 
externalities, in order for networks to continue to exist. These benefits may be 
of a very diverse sort Ð but because networks are voluntary, nodes will exit if 
they do not perceive benefits, and seek out other kinds of arrangements.
77
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Local civil society actors play a key role in persuading states to adopt new norms. 
Crucially, they do so as ÔinsidersÕ appealing to their states to adhere to standards of 
Ôappropriate behaviourÕ. However, they often face significant challenges in doing so. 
Without an understanding of the political, ideational and material constraints on their 
work, it is easy for outsiders to dismiss their efforts as being ÔweakÕ. This can 
delegitimise and disempower them, especially if such thinking leads to their exclusion 
from processes and fora relevant to their work. 
 
Working through a formalised network can change the ways and the conditions under 
which local civil society actors engage in norm entrepreneurship. As the case of 
APRRN demonstrates, participation in a formalised network can strengthened the 
visibility, capacity and connectedness of local civil society actors. It can reconfigure 
power-relations between them and other powerful actors. It can facilitate the 
development of Ôregional imaginationÕ and help them engage in Ôscale shiftingÕ in 
order to maximise opportunities for advocacy at multiple levels.  
 
A formalised network can also become an actor in itself even as it functions as an 
organisational platform for members. If the aim of the network is to foster norm 
entrepreneurship amongst members, it is important for it to avoid taking over the role 
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of members, absorbing valuable resources and opportunities for advocacy. Working 
in a diverse network introduces sensitivities between members. In order to prevent 
member disengagement, it is important for these sensitivities to be understood and 
managed so that an enabling environment can be created for norm entrepreneurship to 
flourish amongst members until the desired norm cascade occurs.  
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